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ABSTRACT
Intellectual humility is commonly thought to be a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that 
guides our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth and avoid error. Over the last 
decade, psychologists, philosophers, and other researchers have begun to explore intellectual 
humility, using analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, implications, and value. This 
review describes central questions explored by researchers and highlights opportunities for multi-
disciplinary investigation.
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Intellectual humility (IH) is commonly thought to be 
a mindset, disposition, or personality trait that guides 
our reactions to evidence as we seek to pursue the truth 
and avoid error. IH helps us overcome problematic egoic 
and egoistic responses to our evidence. This mindset 
frees us up to seek out and evaluate evidence in such 
a way that we are less influenced by our own self- 
oriented motives and more oriented toward reality. IH 
appears to be valuable in many domains of life – from 
education to interreligious dialogue to civic discourse. It 
promises to help us avoid headstrong decisions and 
erroneous opinions, and it allows us to engage more 
constructively with our fellow citizens.
Over the last decade, psychologists, philosophers, 
and other researchers have begun to explore IH, using 
analytical and empirical tools to understand its nature, 
implications, and value. Although much of this work is in 
personality and social psychology, the issues invite many 
questions at the interface of psychology and philosophy.
This article describes central questions explored by 
researchers and highlights future opportunities for mul-
tidisciplinary investigation of IH. The topic of IH is at 
once theoretically fascinating and significant for our 
practical lives, but progress depends on integrating 
knowledge across disciplinary boundaries. I offer sug-
gestions for the next steps. My review of past research 
will focus on four main questions:
(1) What is IH?
(2) How do we recognize IH?
(3) What factors underpin and undermine IH?
(4) What are the benefits of IH?
1. What is intellectual humility?
We need an account, characterization, or definition of IH 
in order to examine IH. If we don’t know – at least 
approximately – what IH is, we presumably cannot 
study it empirically, understand its connection to other 
traits and states, or design interventions for making 
people more intellectually humble. But characterizing 
IH has not proven to be straightforward. The literature 
on IH is in a state of conceptual disarray.
What have researchers said about the nature of IH? In 
a brief space, it is hard to summarize the wide range of 
proposals discussed in hundreds of articles and chapters, 
but I find it useful to identify four broad types of accounts 
found in the literature. Essentially, these accounts put 
forward different conceptual themes that have emerged 
in recent discussions. I will assume that these accounts, at 
a minimum, aim to capture what is necessary for IH. First, 
there are what I call Attitude Management accounts:
● IH is ‘a trait that reflects the degree to which people 
are generally willing to reconsider their views’ 
(Hoyle et al., 2016, p. 171).
● ‘We operationally define [IH] as reduced defensive-
ness when one’s beliefs are challenged’ (Van 
Tongeren et al., 2014, p. 63).
● IH ‘involves the ability to regulate one’s need to 
appear “right” or “correct” in regard to one’s beliefs 
or ideas’ (Davis & Hook, 2014, p. 112).
Attitude Management accounts of IH endorse the fol-
lowing broad idea:
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Attitude Management: IH is a mindset (or disposition 
or trait) that regulates1 our attitude-forming practices 
and our responses to our attitudes.
According to this idea, IH might make our attitudes 
more sensitive to counterevidence we encounter; it 
might make our responses to attitude challenges less 
defensive; or it might make us less concerned to appear 
to be right. One division among Attitude Management 
accounts is fairly clear: some variants focus on self- 
directed attitudes whereas others focus on other- 
directed attitudes. For example, I noted one account on 
which IH is a trait reflecting whether people are willing 
to reconsider their views, but another one I mentioned 
says that IH is the ability to regulate our need to appear 
to be right about our beliefs and ideas. The former is 
a psychological trait that guides our deliberation about 
our own views whereas the latter is an interpersonal or 
self-presentational motive that’s distinct from our pri-
vate deliberation about our views. We can imagine 
someone who has the trait but fails to have the motive, 
and vice versa. There’s diversity among Attitude 
Management accounts depending on what type of atti-
tudes IH is supposed to regulate.
In contrast with Attitude Management accounts, con-
sider what I call Realistic Self-assessment accounts:
● IH is ‘a realistic evaluation of one’s epistemic capa-
cities’ (Gregg & Mahadevan, 2014, p. 8).
● ‘IH is the virtue of accurately tracking what one 
could nonculpably take to be the positive epistemic 
status of one’s own beliefs’ (Church & Barrett, 2016, 
p. 69).
● IH is a ‘disposition not to adopt epistemically 
improper higher-order epistemic attitudes [that is, 
attitudes about the epistemic status of one’s atti-
tudes], and to adopt . . . epistemically proper 
higher-order epistemic attitudes’ (Hazlett, 2012, 
p. 220).
Realistic Self-assessment accounts embrace the follow-
ing broad idea:
Realistic Self-assessment: IH is a mindset (or trait or 
disposition) that regulates accurate or normatively 
appropriate evaluations of our capacities, limitations, 
and attitudes as inquirers.
Whereas Attitude Management accounts focus on the 
regulation of attitude-forming activities broadly, 
Realistic Self-assessment accounts are concerned more 
narrowly with particular types of self-evaluation. Within 
this latter category of accounts, we find diversity. For 
example, some accounts propose that IH requires eval-
uating our epistemic capacities whereas others say it 
requires our having actual beliefs, or dispositions to 
have beliefs, about the epistemic status of our beliefs. 
These are distinct objects of assessment. Someone could 
potentially assess her epistemic capacities even when 
those capacities have not produced actual beliefs, for 
example. Furthermore, some accounts treat IH as a state 
of evaluating one’s capacities or, alternatively, as 
a disposition to evaluate one’s beliefs in certain ways. 
These accounts highlight different ways to understand 
the ontology of IH, a topic I return to below. I should add 
that if Realistic Self-assessment proposals require ‘an 
accurate view of self,’ this may dramatically limit the 
number of people who have IH, granting the plausible 
assumption that accurate self-views are hard won 
(Dunning et al., 2004).
Third, there are Low Self-concern accounts:
● ‘IH is in large part negative: aimed at avoiding self- 
importance . . . we might say that IH opposes self- 
importance when it interferes with a pure and 
penetrating pursuit of intellectual goals’ 
(Schellenberg, 2015, p. 220).
● ‘The virtue of humility [of which IH is a subtype] is 
intelligent lack of concern for self-importance, 
where self-importance is construed as conferred 
by social status, glory, honor, superiority, special 
entitlements, prestige, or power . . . We think the 
virtue of humility is just the absence of [pride]’ 
(Roberts & Cleveland, 2016, p. 33).
These accounts embrace the following idea:
Low Self-concern: IH is a mindset (or trait or disposi-
tion) that regulates low concern for one’s own intellec-
tual self-importance.
Among Low Self-concern accounts, we find various 
ways to think about IH. One idea is that IH is an ‘absence’ 
of intellectual pride whereas another says that IH 
‘opposes’ a range of factors that underlie intellectual 
self-importance. These are subtly different proposals, 
for it seems as though someone could have the 
‘absence’ variety of IH without having anything that 
‘opposes’ self-importance.
Finally, Mixed accounts of IH pull together elements 
from the accounts noted above, treating them as neces-
sary but not alone sufficient for IH. For example, some 
Mixed accounts join variants of the Attitude 
Management and Realistic Self-assessment accounts:
● ‘IH consists in proper attentiveness to, and owning 
of, one’s intellectual limitations,’ where ‘owning . . . 
consists in a dispositional profile that includes cog-
nitive, behavioral, motivational, and affective 
responses to an awareness of one’s limitations’ 
(Whitcomb et al., 2017, pp. 520, 518).
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● ‘We define specific IH as the recognition that 
a particular personal view may be fallible, accom-
panied by an appropriate attentiveness to limita-
tions in obtaining and evaluating information 
relevant to it’ (Hoyle et al., 2016, p. 165).
The following Mixed account fuses versions of the 
Realistic Self-assessment and Low Self-concern accounts:
● IH is ‘a willingness to recognize the limits of one’s 
knowledge and appreciate others’ intellectual 
strengths’ (Porter & Schumann, 2018, p. 140).
The following three Mixed accounts appear to bring 
together variations of the Realistic Self-assessment, 
Low Self-concern, and Attitude Management accounts 
(as well as elements that do not fit within any of those 
three categories):
● ‘IH is a non-threatening awareness of one’s intellec-
tual fallibility . . . Such a non-threatening awareness 
of one’s intellectual fallibility offers a healthy inde-
pendence between one’s intellect and ego, mean-
ing that a person will not feel threatened by 
intellectual disagreements, will not be overconfi-
dent about his or her knowledge, will respect the 
viewpoints of others, and will be open to revising 
his or her viewpoints when warranted’ (Krumrei- 
Mancuso, 2017, p. 14).
● ‘IH regarding religious beliefs is characterized, at 
least in part, by an awareness of the fallibility of 
one’s religious beliefs, discretion in asserting those 
beliefs, comfort keeping one’s religious beliefs pri-
vate, and respect for others’ religious beliefs’ 
(Hopkin et al., 2014, p. 58).
● IH involves ‘the down-regulation of egoistic 
motives in favor of other-orientedness, as well as 
an accurate view of oneself. Down-regulating ego-
istic motives should include forgoing defensiveness 
when confronted about one’s beliefs, and being 
more other-oriented should translate to being less 
antagonistic toward the views of others that run 
counter to one’s own views or beliefs. Humility also 
involves accurate self-awareness of strengths and 
weaknesses, which allows humble individuals to 
acknowledge and take into account their limita-
tions and inadequacies, especially when confronted 
by others who believe differently’ (Van Tongeren 
et al., 2014, p. 63).
These disparate accounts of IH strongly suggest there is 
no widely agreed upon ‘basic’ or ‘core’ notion of IH in the 
literature. Why haven’t researchers so far developed 
a commonly shared notion of the phenomenon they 
are apparently studying? Here are two potential 
explanations.
First, researchers have different theoretical goals and 
naturally characterize IH differently. Psychologists char-
acterize IH so that they can operationalize it and study it 
using psychometric tools (e.g. self- and other-reports). 
Philosophers articulate jointly necessary and sufficient 
conditions for IH or, if not conceptual analyses, informa-
tive descriptions. Psychologists’ characterizations do not 
typically display the conceptual unity and precision 
found in philosophers’ analyses. Psychologists lists qua-
lities, some of which may or may not be independently 
necessary or jointly sufficient for IH; we are not always 
told how these qualities are logically related to IH. 
Sometimes researchers blend conceptualizations of IH 
with descriptions of the consequences of IH, without 
drawing distinctions between the two. Generally, it can 
be hard to know whether any two characterizations of IH 
are consistent or in conflict.
A second explanation for the lack of conceptual 
unanimity is that some researchers have assumed that 
IH is a subdomain of general humility whereas others 
have not. General humility has been studied much more 
extensively than IH (Tangney, 2009) and it factors into 
widely adopted measures of personality (the ‘Big Six’: 
see Ashton et al., 2004). Some IH researchers use char-
acterizations of IH that, to various degrees, ‘piggyback’ 
on preexisting characterizations of general humility. 
These researchers have apparently assumed that general 
humility is a plausible starting point for understanding 
IH. Their basic thought is that general humility will reveal 
distinctive features in ‘intellectual’ contexts and those 
features constitute IH. For reasons I explain below, this 
way of characterizing IH faces problems.
For better or worse, it appears that researchers have 
not been focusing on the same phenomenon. The ‘IH’ 
label is a bit of language that can be used to describe 
many distinct features and states. But conceptual confu-
sion – and the verbal disputes among researchers that 
may ensue – poses a challenge for the field to manage in 
the coming years.
The matter of conceptual diversity has been recog-
nized. Nadelhoffer et al. (2016) observe concerning gen-
eral humility: ‘one of the key issues when it comes to the 
on-going debate . . . is where we should begin – that is, 
which varieties of humility should we embrace and 
which should we eschew?’ (p. 15). The trouble is that 
researchers’ choices about ‘where we should begin’ are 
not constrained enough to lead everyone in roughly the 
same direction. But since everyone uses ‘IH’ to talk about 
their proposals, it isn’t obvious what we have learned 
thus far or what differences there are between different 
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proposals and approaches. One possibility is that we 
now know something about a variety of distinct mind-
sets or traits, which differ from each other in many 
respects aside from name. If that’s so, researchers could 
design new labels that make clear which feature or 
features they are focusing on (e.g. ‘lack-of-self- 
importance IH,’ ‘limitations-owning IH,’ or the like). 
Then their alternate conceptualizations could duke it 
out in the marketplace of data. The crucial possibility 
I’m raising here is that there just is not any one thing that 
answers to the name ‘IH’ and so different concepts could 
prove useful for different theoretical, explanatory, and 
predictive purposes.2
In the present moment, the language of ‘IH’ has 
a resonance that lets researchers smile and nod along 
in conversation, feeling they know what others are talk-
ing about, presuming everybody’s talking about the 
same phenomenon, more or less. They feel they intui-
tively grasp what IH is. As someone who has listened to 
both philosophers and psychologists talk about IH a fair 
bit, I doubt there is anywhere near as much shared 
ground as is sometimes assumed – inside either field or 
between fields. Here’s the trouble: researchers are unli-
kely as a group to pursue joint investigation effectively 
when they lack a shared core concept of some phenom-
enon. A core concept can be revised as research 
advances, but researchers would benefit from 
a common point of departure for investigation – unless 
they opt to treat the conceptual diversity as stemming 
from the fact that IH simply comes in many varieties, 
a theoretical perspective I don’t think is often repre-
sented in the discussion. But some have been pessimistic 
about the existence of a shared notion of IH. Dunnington 
(2016), for instance, argues that conflicting conceptions 
of human nature and flourishing underwrite different 
characterizations of IH, and that the degree to which 
‘agreement [about the nature of IH] seems attainable is 
correlative to the extent we are willing to allow [political] 
liberalism to determine the desiderata for an account of 
the virtues’ (p. 95).
But let’s just assume that researchers are interested in 
a common phenomenon. Thus, they need something 
like a core concept of IH. Before I suggest what that 
could be, let me describe some further disputes about 
IH. First, the ontology of IH is controversial. There is no 
consensus over whether IH is a mindset, a disposition, 
a personality trait, an intellectual virtue, a set of self- 
regulatory abilities, a cluster of attitudes, or an absence 
of intellectual vice. I don’t know whether these ontolo-
gical disagreements can be resolved easily. They may 
trace back to genuinely incompatible conceptual frame-
works for modelling human cognition and intellectual 
virtue. Alternatively, some of the disputes may be merely 
verbal or only apparent at first sight. For example, per-
haps what some researchers mean by ‘self-regulatory 
abilities’ can be understood in terms of bundles of per-
sonality traits or mindsets. To take another example, 
Tanesini (2018) contends that IH is a cluster of attitudes 
‘involved in the evaluation of aspects of one’s own cog-
nitive agency’ (p. 410) and then argues that sometimes 
strong attitudes can be properly identified as intellectual 
virtues (pp. 416–18). Another ontological dispute con-
cerns whether IH is a mindset, disposition, or personality 
trait, or, alternatively, a state that is brought about by 
some such mindset, disposition, or trait (Zachry et al., 
2018). Of course, we can think of IH as both a state and 
a trait, because there’s a difference between how intel-
lectually humble a person is right now (a state) com-
pared to how intellectually humble they tend to be 
across time and in different situations (a trait). Once 
again, when some researchers focus on the trait and 
others focus on the state, they may not genuinely dis-
agree even when it seems they do, given that traits 
together with circumstances normally produce particu-
lar states.
Here is a further disagreement about the character-
ization of IH. Is IH a general disposition (or trait or mind-
set) relevant to certain intellectual activities, or is IH 
a way for us to hold specific attitudes, or both? Some 
researchers have suggested distinct psychometric mea-
sures for general IH and specific IH, where the former is IH 
spanning all relevant attitudes and intellectual activities, 
and the latter is IH concerning particular attitudes (Hoyle 
et al., 2016). Hoyle et al. (2016) observe that ‘measures of 
general IH tell us only how intellectually humble or 
arrogant people are overall but may say little about 
their stance toward any particular view’ (p. 171). 
Someone can have high levels of general IH and be 
intellectually arrogant with respect to specific attitudes, 
or she can have low levels of general IH and high levels 
of IH with respect to specific attitudes. In other words, 
being high (or low) in general IH does not necessarily 
predict high (or low) specific IH, or vice versa.
The contrast between general and specific IH should 
be joined by another one: domain IH. Although this 
notion does not appear in the literature, the idea is 
that domain IH involves a set of attitudes or activities 
that are relevant in a particular domain or context.3 One 
example of a domain could be someone’s thinking 
about a particular subject matter – biology, say. 
Someone’s domain IH concerning biology is significantly 
broader than her specific IH concerning her belief in 
evolution by natural selection, but still narrower than 
the scope of her general IH. Alternatively, the domain 
could also be fixed by her purposes or goals in some 
situation. For example, domain IH could be fixed by her 
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attitudes and intellectual activities when she’s taking an 
academic test, in contrast to an informal social setting, 
such as skeet shooting with her friends. Domain IH could 
be broader than specific IH, but narrower than general 
IH. If psychologists could devise measures of domain IH, 
we might learn more about the factors that influence the 
promotion of IH in specific settings.4
Thus, there are important and unsettled questions 
about the appropriate level of generality or specificity 
at which IH is most fruitfully studied. Researchers should 
study IH with greater sensitivity to this issue, because IH 
is always found in specific contexts ‘in the wild.’ 
Doubtless, a better understanding of distinct categories 
of IH (e.g., general, specific, and domain) would allow for 
a deeper understanding of IH and the ways in which it 
can be promoted. The connections between general, 
specific, and domain IH are important for understanding 
the nature of IH, and those connections are a central but 
underexplored topic. I return to that theme below, as it 
bears on how IH can be promoted and what benefits it 
brings.
Before I conclude my discussion of the nature of IH, 
let me turn to a subtle terminological issue. Some the-
orists conceive of IH as having a sort of ‘public face,’ in 
much the way that general humility does. The idea is 
that IH helps to regulate social relations and behavior; it 
acts as a kind of ‘lubricant’ between people, helping 
them get along. As McElroy et al. (2014) put it, ‘a key 
function of IH is to prevent relational wear-and-tear, like 
oil prevents an engine from overheating’ (McElroy et al., 
2014, p. 21). But characterizing IH as a socially-oriented 
mindset, disposition, or trait – something that’s essen-
tially expressed in social contexts – is a mistake. That’s 
a somewhat controversial position, but I will try to argue 
for it.
Whatever else it is, IH is a way for people to manage 
evidence and information that is relevant to their inquiry 
or intellectual life – roughly, whichever attitudes, pro-
cesses, and activities are implicated in seeking truth and 
avoiding error. This is not at all to deny that the social 
world shapes intellectual life in many respects. To take 
just one example, we must determine when to trust the 
word of others. But IH does not seem to be an essentially 
social mindset, disposition, or trait. Even when IH has 
salient social consequences, those consequences should 
not be confused with the essential features of IH itself.
Notice why that point is important. Suppose some-
one has (general, domain, or specific) IH to a high 
degree. She may receive new evidence indicating she 
is prone to err. She will often respond to that evidence in 
ways that are characteristic of IH. More specifically, she 
may respond to that evidence by managing her atti-
tudes in appropriate ways; by coming to have a more 
realistic assessment of her limitations and epistemic 
capacities; by having low self-focus in light of challenges 
to her views; or by doing some combination of these 
things. To begin to think clearly about the function of IH 
here, we must distinguish between the person and her 
social world. IH should be seen as primarily about the 
person herself, not her social world. IH is a feature of 
human cognition that may have interpersonal 
consequences.
By contrast, one fairly commonplace idea in the 
recent literature, noted above, is that both general humi-
lity and IH involve
the down-regulation of egoistic motives in favor of 
other-orientedness, as well as an accurate view of oneself. 
Down-regulating egoistic motives should include for-
going defensiveness when confronted about one’s 
beliefs, and being more other-oriented should translate 
to being less antagonistic toward the views of others that 
run counter to one’s own views or beliefs. (Van Tongeren 
et al., 2014, p. 63; emphasis added; cf. Davis et al. 2011 
and 2013)
On such conceptions of IH, the flipside of egoistic or 
egoic behavior is other-oriented behavior. One 
assumption here may be that self-orientation and 
other-orientation are inversely related. But they 
aren’t – an egoless person could be totally indifferent 
to others.5 Leaving that issue aside, the important 
question is whether ‘the down-regulation of egoistic 
motives in favor of other-orientedness’ represents 
a useful way to model IH. While that idea may help to 
make sense of general humility – a concept imbued 
with social meaning – it seems to mischaracterize IH. 
Again, IH is way for us to manage information that’s 
relevant to our pursuit of truth and avoidance of error. 
The essence of IH, then, is not a matter of how we react 
to other people, but how we react to information 
relevant to our inquiry. It is about how we respond to 
evidence concerning reality. IH involves private mental 
states and processes, not publicly observable states or 
interpersonal processes. We might put the idea, sug-
gestively, as follows: IH ‘down-regulates’ egoic and 
egoistic motives in favor of reality-orientedness.6
The slogan is meant to be evocative, but I should try 
to express the idea slightly differently – maybe more 
clearly. We are motived by all sorts of self-focused con-
siderations. Will this or that belief or belief-forming 
method make me feel good? Will it make me successful 
or popular? Is this what people who share my values 
accept? We can be moved by such considerations as we 
make up our minds. But there’s always the question of 
whether a belief is actually correct and whether 
a method reliably produces true beliefs, independent 
of what the belief or method does for us personally. IH 
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reduces the role of self-focused motives in our inquiry, 
making us more concerned to figure things out, period.
As I have observed, there is a great deal of disagree-
ment over the definition of IH and this poses obstacles 
for effective multidisciplinary research, on the assump-
tion that everyone is in fact hunting the same quarry. 
Here are some suggestions for moving forward. First, 
researchers should be as explicit as possible about 
their conceptions of IH, striving to distinguish between 
the nature of IH and its consequences. That goal has 
been pursued admirably by Leary et al. (2017), who 
develop a ‘unidimensional’ measure of IH, designed 
not to be conflated with the behavioral upshots of IH. 
The rigorous analytical work by Whitcomb et al. (2017) 
lays out a principled account of what to treat as IH and 
what to treat as consequences of IH. Philosophers can 
assist psychologists with the work of conceptual clarifi-
cation, as has been the case with a few recent collabora-
tions – see, for example, Haggard et al. (2018) and Leary 
et al. (2017, note 1). Second, researchers could work to 
create a shared ‘core’ concept of IH. That concept 
couldn’t possibly encompass all of the conceptual diver-
sity that has so far been labeled ‘IH,’ it seems to me, but it 
could at least capture one phenomenon that many 
researchers have sought to understand. The core con-
cept would be a common target for researchers, though 
they may devise different models and explanations of it, 
thus unifying the rapidly expanding field of IH research. 
A core concept is not an analysis or definition. It is an 
elucidation of a target phenomenon that may be subject 
to different kinds of analysis or definition.
I have already hinted at one sketch of a possible core 
concept of IH: IH down-regulates self-oriented motives 
in information processing in favor of reality- 
orientedness. To further clarify the idea, we would 
need to say considerably more about the types of infor-
mation processing that IH is supposed to help to man-
age, the nature of ‘reality-orientedness,’ and the types of 
self-oriented factors that prevent us from getting things 
right. Leaving more elucidation aside, an important 
question remains: according to the core concept, how 
does IH work? By design, the core concept remains 
silent. But it can be fleshed out using the kind of char-
acterizations of IH that researchers have developed 
already. Some researchers may say that IH regulates 
attitude-forming tendencies, making people high in IH 
more likely to reconsider their views, more likely to fairly 
consider sources of evidence that threaten their prior 
opinions, and so on. Other researchers could say that IH 
helps people accurately or appropriately evaluate their 
beliefs and intellectual limitations, or that IH reduces 
people’s concern for their own intellectual self- 
importance. Researchers could also join together these 
features in various ways. Crucially, all these ways of 
fleshing out the idea of IH assume that different 
mechanisms regulate egoic or egoistic responses to 
information. Each one suggests that IH helps people 
become better attuned to their evidence and less 
oriented toward their egoic and egoistic motives. IH is 
a ‘hypoegoic’ concept (Leary & Terry, 2012) in the sense 
that it suppresses or regulates particular kinds of self- 
centeredness in inquiry.7
In any event, a widely recognized core concept 
should make disagreements among researchers more 
productive and more tractable. A lack of such a core 
concept could be the source of the conceptual diversity 
found in the literature on IH. Whether some posited 
mechanism underlies IH in the broad sense specified 
by the core concept seems to be something researchers 
could discover. We may also find that apparently incon-
sistent approaches to modeling IH are in fact compatible 
because they highlight different aspects of the operation 
of IH in cognition. At any rate, if the core concept 
described above is a decent sketch, researchers can 
find greater agreement about the type of phenomenon 
under investigation as well as a better understanding of 
what evidence could adjudicate between competing 
models and explanations.
2. How do we recognize intellectual humility?
Even supposing that researchers eventually agree about 
the correct characterization of IH, or at least some core 
concept of IH, that does not necessarily mean they will 
be able to tell us who has IH or how IH functions in 
cognition and the social world. So, how can researchers 
measure IH effectively? Furthermore, outside the labora-
tory, how do people perceive (and misperceive) it? This 
review continues by noting some answers discussed in 
the literature. Although I hope future treatments of IH 
move past basic definitional disorder, in what follows 
I ignore conceptual differences among different propo-
sals, only occasionally noting conflicts.
Researchers seeking to study IH empirically have 
devised measurement techniques. Their views about 
the nature of IH guide where they look for it. For exam-
ple, if they conceptualize IH as an essentially social trait 
or virtue, they expect to find it in interpersonal engage-
ments. But people need not explicitly conceptualize IH in 
order to try to identify it in everyday life. We make 
judgments about IH, in others and ourselves, using 
naïve theories. One central focus of research, then, is 
how researchers and lay persons alike can recognize IH 
and how they can do so more effectively.
A recent survey article on measures of humility noted 
that over 150 empirical samples concerning humility 
6 N. BALLANTYNE
exist, as well as around twenty different measures (Davis 
et al., 2016).8 One commonplace lament in the psycho-
logical literature is that measuring general humility and 
IH is not straightforward. There is currently no ‘gold 
standard’ for measuring IH, even though the field has 
developed several new measures (see, e.g. Zachry et al., 
2018; Haggard et al., 2018; Leary et al., 2017; Alfano et al., 
2017; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016; McElroy et al., 
2014). The lack of consensus about measurement seems 
to follow from the fact that researchers have used dif-
ferent definitions of IH to construct their items. 
Comparative work needs to be done on existing 
measures.
Psychologists routinely deploy self-report measures 
for studying all kinds of constructs, but in the case of 
humility and IH, some researchers have worried about 
the value of self-reports. The concept of general humility 
is typically connected to an accurate assessment of the 
self and low self-focus. That construct is essentially about 
the self. But this means that people may self-enhance 
when completing self-reports, claiming to have more 
humility than they really do. The so-called modesty 
effect predicts that actual humility is inversely related 
to the self-enhancement of humility (Tangney, 2009). 
Humble people will be modest in their reporting of 
their humility, leading to lower self-ratings, whereas 
people who are low in humility will self-enhance, inflat-
ing their self-ratings. If there is a modesty effect, self- 
reports will be systematically biased and presumably 
represent a flawed method for studying humility. Is 
there any evidence for a modesty effect on self-reports 
of humility or IH? The matter is controversial.
In a review of measures of humility and IH, Hill et al. 
(2016) note that ‘there is little evidence to date that self- 
reports of humility are, in fact, biased’ by the modesty 
effect (p. 121). Leary et al. (2017) developed a measure of 
IH that’s not correlated with social desirability, meaning 
that respondents do not tend to answer questions in 
a manner that is viewed favorably by others. If IH is not 
socially desirable, we can set aside the idea that people 
tend to seek to self-enhance by claiming greater IH than 
they have. On the other hand, Davis et al. (2013) found 
a negative correlation between self- and other-reports of 
humility among a group of acquaintances. They 
observed that as self-reports of humility increase, other- 
reports of humility for the same target tend to decease. 
Given that self- and other-ratings can diverge in this way, 
it is possible that genuinely humble people self-report 
lower levels of humility than they really have and that 
somewhat arrogant people exaggerate their level of 
humility. Meagher et al. (2015) found that ‘high IH self- 
reports are driven in large part by socially desirable 
responding’ (p. 43). Their studies found a strongly 
positive association between high self-reported IH and 
self-enhancement on socially valued attributes. Meagher 
et al. (2015) note that while it is possible that subjects 
high in IH are, as a matter of fact, better leaders, more 
competent, and so forth, it is unlikely that subjects’ high 
self-appraisals are correct across a wide range of desir-
able attributes. The researchers suggest that a more 
plausible hypothesis is that high IH self-reports are 
fueled by socially desirable responding, in keeping with 
Vazire’s (2010) influential proposal that people’s self- 
ratings on highly evaluative traits are less accurate than 
the ratings of others. In addition, Wright et al. (2017) say 
in passing that at least one measure of humility is pro-
blematic in part ‘because it relies on direct self-report, 
which makes it more likely that participants will self- 
enhance (or otherwise misreport)’ (p. 8). In favor of the 
accuracy of self-reports, however, Krumrei-Mancuso and 
Rouse (2016, p. 210) note two earlier studies of general 
humility. One study (Rowatt et al., 2006) found that self- 
reported humility was similar to an implicit assessment 
of humility, and presumably the implicit test would not 
be subject to a modesty effect; another study (Landrum, 
2011) found that self-report measures of humility were 
not correlated with social desirability.
If we are armed exclusively with self-reports, we can’t 
directly test the hypothesis that self-reports of humility 
are subject to a modesty effect. That is because, for any 
given group of people, we do not have a known baseline 
of non-self-report humility data against which to com-
pare self-report data. For example, if we could know – 
independently of self-reports – that you are high in IH 
and I am low in IH, relative to each other, then we could 
see how well-calibrated our self-reporting is with the 
facts. After studying a large enough number of subjects, 
we could draw a conclusion about the presence of 
a modesty effect in our sample. So, the crucial question 
is: aside from self-reports, what sources of information 
can we draw on to recognize IH?
We could study widely reputed ‘exemplars’ of IH, but 
this assumes that social perception of IH is accurate. That 
assumption is not obviously correct, as I suggest below. 
Other-reports of IH are not a silver bullet and it is fre-
quently assumed that people are not good at judging 
a target’s internal traits unless they have considerable 
familiarity with the target. Generally, what we need is 
a source of information about IH that is not itself unpro-
ven or in doubt. One possibility is that some measures of 
humility and IH succumb to the modesty effect while 
others do not, and so we could rely on the latter type of 
measures to proceed. For example, Krumrei-Mancuso 
and Rouse (2016) assume that implicit assessments of 
humility will not run into trouble with the effect. 
Although one implicit test for humility and arrogance is 
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noted by Hill et al. (2016) in a review of humility mea-
sures, I don’t believe an implicit assessment of IH exists 
at the time of writing. In any event, I suspect implicit 
measures risk overlooking the explicit, slow, and effortful 
cognitive processing sometimes involved in manifesting 
IH in many ordinary contexts; and as Samuelson and 
Church (2015, pp. 1107–1108) suggest, IH often seems 
to involve precisely that sort of cognitive processing. 
Furthermore, implicit measures often work because 
they assess a belief, such as someone’s prejudicial belief 
about a group of people. But if IH is not a belief, as some 
researchers claim, it isn’t clear how implicit measures will 
help at all.
Faced with the potential of bias on self-reporting for 
humility and IH, some researchers have adopted alter-
native methodologies. Two significant trends in the lit-
erature attest to this point.
First, some researchers have assumed that general 
humility is easier to assess in other people than in our-
selves. Their idea is that if we want to know whether 
people are humble, don’t ask them – ask people who 
know them. This may be a promising way to study 
general humility. As I noted above, though, IH is most 
plausibly found in private mental states, not in the social 
world, and so this approach to measurement has crucial 
limitations. Even so, using other-reports sidesteps poten-
tial measurement problems related to self- 
enhancement. Davis et al. (2010, 2011, 2013) have devel-
oped a measure of ‘relational humility,’ which is a kind of 
social judgment, as opposed to a mindset, disposition, or 
trait. Measures of relational humility have had significant 
uptake in the literature, in part because they comport 
with influential findings in social and personality psy-
chology. Vazire (2010) has proposed that self/other 
knowledge asymmetries mean that ratings by other 
people tend to be more accurate than self-assessments 
when the target traits are both desirable and behavioral, 
such as extraversion. Since humility and IH are presum-
ably desirable, researchers have thought they are sub-
ject to self/other knowledge asymmetries, too – though 
note, as I argued above, it is problematic to think of IH as 
a behavioral trait.9
Second, researchers have used measures of relational 
humility to assess consensus among raters (Davis et al., 
2013). Rather than just ask one judge about a target 
person’s humility, researchers have developed methods 
for finding consensus among multiple judges. 
Consensus among judges on relational humility can 
indicate what Davis et al. (2013) call ‘trait humility,’ 
which picks out a target’s reputational features. In brief 
periods of time (twenty-minute sessions), researchers 
did not find that consensus would develop among unac-
quainted participants; but researchers have observed 
that over the course of several months, a group can 
reach consensus about the IH of a target (Meagher 
et al., 2015). McElroy et al. (2014) also created an other- 
reporting measure of IH. They theorized that IH is social 
in nature, given that it helps to regulate social interac-
tions concerning one’s beliefs and worldview. When 
people face the give-and-take of debate and discussion, 
they manifest their level of IH. The other-report measure 
from McElroy et al. includes items that capture observa-
ble behaviors that presumably reflect IH or intellectual 
arrogance.
While the shift to relational humility is interesting, 
especially for the study of general humility, it raises 
problems for the study of IH. Consider one issue. Are 
people often well positioned by their evidence to recog-
nize IH in a target? Even if they have evidence that tracks 
IH in a target, do they have good epistemic norms to 
help them interpret their evidence effectively? In typical 
social situations, there are inevitable gaps in our evi-
dence concerning other minds, and the norms we use 
to understand our evidence are sometimes flawed. Our 
ignorance of other people’s minds seems especially sali-
ent if we characterize IH as involving a hypoegoic mind-
set (Leary & Terry, 2012). If IH positions people to 
overcome tendencies toward self-oriented cognition in 
order to be better oriented toward reality, gaining 
knowledge of that feature of cognition may be difficult. 
Given our limited knowledge of others’ minds, how can 
we expect to determine whether others have the rele-
vant hypoegoic mental states?
We are imperfect judges of how other people’s out-
ward behavior reflects their minds. We may be inclined 
to attribute high levels of IH to other people who agree 
with us or who share our values. After all, we’ll often 
think that intellectually humble people are the ones who 
are oriented toward reality – just like us! We may also 
overestimate how much other people’s observable 
behaviors are explained by their character traits as 
opposed to situational influences (the fundamental attri-
bution error), which may lead us to over-attribute intel-
lectual arrogance or dogmatism when making sense of 
others’ behavior. In fact, we tend to make stronger dis-
positional attributions for undesirable traits, such as 
intellectual arrogance, than desirable ones. In view of 
the psychological principle that ‘bad is stronger than 
good’ (Baumeister et al., 2001), we can expect that 
signs of arrogance will often be more salient than signs 
of humility, leading to skewed perception of IH.
Some biases on judgments of IH in others comport 
with what Davis and Hook (2014) call the ‘humility- 
values’ hypothesis, according to which constructs such 
as values and ‘moral foundations’ (Graham et al., 2013) 
influence the information that people deem relevant to 
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judgments of humility. Given the apparent risks of self- 
enhancement for IH self-reports, we should be wary of 
the possibility that indirect forms of self-enhancement 
influence other-reporting, too. Potentially, people tend 
to attribute higher levels of IH to people who are similar 
to them in value-relevant respects (e.g., ingroup mem-
bers) and lower levels of IH to those who are different.
But, presumably, we are sometimes able to accurately 
judge IH. For example, college teachers are sometimes 
confident they can know an intellectually arrogant 
undergraduate student when they see one in action 
over the course of a semester. How does this work? 
One suggestion, due to Davis et al. (2011), is that general 
humility is best revealed to other people in four distinc-
tive types of situations: (1) during interpersonal conflict; 
(2) when receiving praise or recognition; (3) while inter-
acting in hierarchical relationships (e.g., a boss and an 
employee); and (4) during cross-cultural interactions, 
where people guided by divergent norms engage with 
each other. Davis et al. focus on general humility and so 
we can presume that the ‘revelatory’ situations which 
apparently give us evidence that tracks facts about IH 
will be different than (1) through (4). The point, though, 
is that insofar as our judgments about IH are based on 
evidence furnished by ‘revelatory’ situations, our judg-
ments will often be accurate. But how any of this actually 
works is uncertain. Obviously, social judgment can 
sometimes be presumed to track features of IH. What 
does it track, exactly? Does it track properties concerning 
how a target manages her attitudes, or her self- 
assessments, or her low self-concern, or some mix of 
these things? If so, how reliable is social judgment of 
IH, in the sense of being accurate over a large run of 
trials? What are the circumstances that make people (un) 
reliable judges? And what rules or heuristics could 
judges follow to boost their reliability as evaluators of 
others’ IH?
Davis et al. (2013) note that people often assess 
humility in others by considering expressed emotions. 
People gather that information through verbal and non- 
verbal communication, but also by learning about 
others’ impressions of a target. They develop an under-
standing of a target’s ‘humility reputation,’ which allows 
them either to forge and deepen social bonds with the 
target or to steer clear of trouble. All of that may hold for 
general humility, but it isn’t so obvious how emotions 
track facts about IH. Inquiry-disrupting emotions are 
presumably part of what IH helps people overcome. 
Take an example to illustrate. When you learn of 
a serious objection to one of your beliefs, you may at 
first show outward signs of embarrassment or frustra-
tion. Your emotional state is one form of egoic cognition 
and it may influence your response to the objection. 
Observers could naturally treat your expression of emo-
tion as an indicator that you are intellectually arrogant. 
But you could in fact overcome or offset the emotion 
and become better oriented toward reality by assimilat-
ing the objection to your viewpoint. The expressed emo-
tion does not reveal what you actually do with the new 
information. Clearly, expressed emotions can sometimes 
provide evidence concerning someone’s IH, but how 
that happens is a subtle, context-sensitive matter.
I am thus in agreement with Meagher et al. (2015) 
who say that ‘a primary goal for future work must be to 
better theorize and assess how IH is revealed to others’ 
(p. 44). Let me add that a closely related goal is to better 
understand how IH is revealed to the self. The matter of 
how humility is disclosed raises fascinating questions 
sometimes touched on in early modern treatments of 
humility. La Rochefoucauld (1678/2007) noted, for 
instance: ‘Humility is often merely a pretence of submis-
siveness, which we use to make other people submit to 
us. It is an artifice by which pride debases itself in order 
to exalt itself; and though it can transform itself in thou-
sands of ways, pride is never better disguised and more 
deceptive than when it is hidden behind the mask of 
humility’ (p. 73, V.254). La Rochefoucauld thought peo-
ple live with considerable ignorance and obscurity about 
their actual motives and intentions, meaning that actors 
may be oblivious to the artifice of their own humble 
pretense. Recently, Sandage et al. (2015) pointed out 
that religious practices can induce ‘delusional humility,’ 
where arrogant people believe they are humble (p. 214). 
That phenomenon is not confined exclusively to reli-
gious believers, of course. In general, I expect that self- 
recognition of IH ordinarily reaches us through engage-
ment with others in circumstances that mirror the ‘reve-
latory’ situations noted by Davis et al. (2011).
To figure out how IH is revealed to others, Meagher 
et al. (2015) underline the need to think more rigorously 
about the contexts and settings where IH is found. They 
note that a general ‘lack of research at the level of 
situations reflects a general dearth within social psychol-
ogy and a failure to fully develop taxonomic understand-
ing of the settings and interactions that characterize 
human life’ (p. 44). What can be done to understand 
better the situations where IH and intellectual arrogance 
are observed? Psychologists have begun to say more 
about these matters (Zachry et al., 2018; Grossmann, 
2017). But the field would benefit greatly from new 
work on IH from researchers who study the fine- 
grained elements of inquiry and our intellectual worlds. 
I have in mind philosophers and historians of science, 
social epistemologists, intellectual historians, anthropol-
ogists, and sociologists of knowledge. These researchers 
are sometimes interested in themes such as credibility, 
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trust, rational deference, expertise, arrogance, dogma-
tism, pseudoscience, and other notions and evaluations 
that could bear on people’s assessment of IH. In my view, 
the toolbox of ideas and techniques that is available to 
understand the dynamics of (mis)recognizing IH in real- 
world contexts could be significantly upgraded by new 
theoretical contributions and case studies from research-
ers outside of psychology.
Learning how we recognize IH, both in the laboratory 
and everyday life, is an important challenge for IH 
researchers. One starting point for future work could 
be established models of personality judgment, such as 
David Funder’s (2012) Realistic Accuracy Model. 
Although people can readily generate judgments 
about IH, in others and themselves, it remains unclear 
how accurate those judgments tend to be. If researchers 
agree that IH is a hypoegoic concept, one involving 
a lack of self-centeredness in intellectual life, then they 
should think more about designing measures that do 
not rely as much on the social world. Doubtless, IH 
manifests in the social world in particular patterns and 
knowing more about that is valuable. But, plausibly, IH 
has its ‘deep’ basis in cognition and metacognition and 
so we must look for it there.
3. What factors support and undermine 
intellectual humility?
So far, I have focused on the nature of IH and how it is 
recognized. Questions about the conditions for IH and its 
identification are distinct from questions about what 
tends to encourage and discourage its development in 
people. In the case of IH, there are many psycho-social 
factors that encourage and discourage its manifestation. 
These factors are related intimately to questions about 
promoting IH through educational programs, training 
regimens, and other interventions. In other words, the 
topic of the present section is one key for converting 
theoretical ideas about IH into practical methods for 
helping people develop IH.10
Whenever we are thinking about factors that encou-
rage or discourage IH, we should focus on a particular 
category of IH. As I noted in Section 1, general IH spans 
relevant attitudes and intellectual activities broadly; spe-
cific IH concerns particular attitudes (Hoyle et al., 2016); 
and domain IH concerns a set of attitudes or intellectual 
activities that are relevant in some specific context, 
whether topical (e.g., our thinking about biology) or 
functional (e.g., our thinking while taking a test). 
A further distinction concerns whether IH is a trait, in 
the sense that it’s a relatively stable mindset or disposi-
tion, or a state at a particular time. People can be 
encouraged to be high or low in IH for any particular 
category and so their IH can be either a trait or a state. 
When we think about factors that influence IH, we need 
to be aware of which varieties of IH may be relevant. For 
example, a given factor may temporarily move people 
into a state of low or high IH while leaving intact their 
degree of trait IH.
What makes people differ in their degree of IH? 
Researchers have investigated various sources of indivi-
dual differences and I will discuss three broad categories 
of explanation found in the literature: (1) metacognitive 
abilities, (2) personal security and threats to meaning 
and values, and (3) self-views.
First, differences in metacognitive ability between 
people may help to explain differences in IH. Deffler 
et al. (2016) say that ‘individual differences in IH may 
partly reflect how people process information and judge 
what they do and do not know’ (p. 255). As Leary et al. 
(2017) note, IH ‘has an obvious metacognitive compo-
nent that involves thinking about the accuracy of one’s 
beliefs, the evidence on which those beliefs are based, 
and one’s ability to evaluate relevant evidence’ (p. 810). 
Variances in the metacognitive ability to discriminate 
between what one knows and doesn’t know can encou-
rage or discourage IH. In addition, Lockhart et al. (2016) 
and Fisher and Keil (2016) report that greater knowledge 
about a topic can, ironically, lead to greater metacogni-
tive ignorance because people cannot always accurately 
evaluate their knowledge within areas of their expertise. 
This research found that highly educated people ‘over-
estimate their ability to explain topics related to their 
formal expertise’ (Fisher & Keil, 2016, p. 1264). Though 
expertise boosts people’s confidence in their ability to 
explain phenomena, they systematically overestimate 
the quality of their explanations (Fisher & Keil, 2016). 
This suggests that someone’s metacognitive ability to 
recognize her knowledge about a topic may be linked to 
her (domain) IH. As Lockhart et al. (2016) point out, 
a metacognitive perspective that shows someone the 
difference between what one can know firsthand versus 
what one can know secondhand ‘may be a critical com-
ponent . . . of knowing when one needs to defer and 
where to allocate cognitive effort’ (p. 490). The metacog-
nitive ability at issue is thus connected to whether and 
when people rely on testimony from others.
In addition to metacognitive abilities for evaluating 
knowledge, metacognitive abilities for recognizing 
biases are relevant for understanding individual differ-
ences in IH. Hansen et al. (2014) observe that subjects 
recognize the serious potential for bias in their judgmen-
tal strategies but, troublingly, they fail to recognize 
a related potential for bias in judgments based on those 
strategies. In other words, subjects noticed that their 
judgmental strategies were not objective while still 
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maintaining that judgments arrived at through those 
strategies were objective. Doubts about the source of 
judgments didn’t stick to the judgments themselves. 
Hansen et al. (2014) note that if recognizing the poten-
tial for bias in one’s judgments is a necessary step for 
debiasing, then biases may pose challenges we cannot 
overcome on our own. That’s because seeing potential 
bias in our strategies does not ‘trigger’ the recognition of 
potential bias in our judgments. What subjects are 
apparently missing is a metacognitive perspective that 
reveals the implications of using biased strategies to 
reach their judgments. If we knowingly use a biased 
method to reach a belief, we should think that belief is 
probably biased. Thus, it is plausible that people who 
suffer from metacognitive ‘gaps’ will also lack IH to some 
extent, due to the fact they are unable to accommodate 
information revealing their intellectual limits.
Second, individual differences in IH have been 
explained by appeal to facts about personal security 
and threats to meaning and values. Researchers suggest 
that general humility can be strengthened by security, 
secure attachment to others, and affirmation of mean-
ing. These factors help a person overcome egocentrism 
and self-focus. For example, Hill et al. (2016) note that 
humility ‘requires a sense of security and enduring per-
sonal worth’ (p. 119). Sandage et al. (2015) note some 
earlier research on ‘healthy attachment’ shows that 
attachment can ‘prepare a person to transcend the 
ego’ (p. 209). Interestingly, general humility is also 
thought to be a basis for security and meaning: humility 
has been called a ‘quiet virtue’ (Lavelock et al., 2014), in 
the sense that it provides a foundation for self- 
acceptance as well as freedom from harmful social com-
parison and concern for status.
Researchers have also noted how IH is connected to 
personal security and threats to meaning. Van Tongeren 
et al. (2014) study how relationship affirmation, in the 
sense of ‘recalling and affirming valuable relationships in 
one’s life’ (p. 64), can lead to reductions in worldview 
defense. They assume that belief systems provide 
answers to existential questions and thus are connected 
to human well-being. They conceptualize humility as 
reduced defensiveness in light of challenges to beliefs 
(a notion that may fail to capture a private mental state 
of IH). The researchers found that people can come to 
see worldview conflicts and disagreements as an exis-
tential threat, and people’s reactions to such threats will 
manifest their humility or arrogance as the case may be. 
For instance, people may respond to disagreement with 
prejudice and distrust toward others as well as increased 
defensiveness about their own beliefs. Psychologists 
have theorized that such ego-defensive responses main-
tain or restore psychological security in the face of 
threats, because increased confidence in beliefs imparts 
meaning. Van Tongeren et al. (2014) found that by 
affirming various aspects of meaning for experimental 
subjects, they could reduce defensiveness and increase 
openness to alternative viewpoints. In other words, sub-
jects’ defensiveness can be mitigated, and IH can be 
encouraged, by affirming meaning.
In a similar vein, research by Van Tongeren, Davis 
et al. (2016) examines what they call ‘growth-focused’ 
and ‘security-focused’ orientations toward religious 
belief. (These constructs come out of the ‘quest reli-
giousness’ paradigm and are related to ‘dwelling’ and 
‘seeking’ religious belief noted by Sandage et al., 2015). 
On one hand, religious believers who are growth- 
focused aim to ‘span ideological differences’ and engage 
in ‘questioning, doubt, and tentativeness’ about their 
own ideas (Van Tongeren, Davis et al. 2016, p. 78). On 
the other hand, believers who are security-focused treat 
their beliefs as a source of personal comfort, clarity, and 
safety (2016, p. 78). Van Tongeren, Davis et al. (2016) 
propose that each orientation forces ‘tradeoffs’ between 
existential security and tolerance of others. In essence, 
people’s worldviews typically optimize either security or 
tolerance at the cost of the other. The researchers say 
that some people may be able to ‘[express] certainty 
about various beliefs while remaining open to change 
others’ (Van Tongeren, Davis et al., 2016, p. 85). In other 
words, there can be intrapersonal differences regarding 
specific IH. A point worth underlining: we should not 
assume that a growth-focused orientation is merely IH or 
that a security-focused orientation is merely intellectual 
arrogance. Instead, these two constructs capture ways in 
which IH can be influenced by the functional roles that 
beliefs play in people’s emotional, moral, and intellectual 
lives. These orientations suggest one source of indivi-
dual differences in IH. They also hint at potential ‘dark 
sides’ of IH. ‘Doubt,’ wrote Lichtenberg, ‘must be no 
more than vigilance, otherwise it can become danger-
ous’ (1765–99/2000, p. 89). Likewise, we may wonder 
when IH becomes dangerous. Supposing people need 
to sacrifice security on the altar of growth in order to 
manifest IH, we might discover that the intellectually 
humble are less healthy or more unhappy than the 
arrogant. The possibility I’m gesturing at is reminiscent 
of so-called positive illusions (Taylor & Brown, 1988).
Third, researchers have proposed explaining differ-
ences in IH by looking at differences in self-views. 
Ottati et al. (2015) found that self-perceived expertise 
encourages closed-minded thinking – that is, a tendency 
to process information in ways that reinforce prior opi-
nions or expectations. Ottati et al. presume that ‘social 
norms’ dictate when it is appropriate for someone to be 
closed- or open-minded and that experts are often 
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regarded as having ‘earned’ the privilege of being dog-
matic in virtue of their backgrounds. As a result, people 
who view themselves as low in expertise tend to be less 
closed-minded than those who view themselves as high 
in expertise. Staats et al. (2018) found that 
U.S. cardiologists with longer experience in the field 
were less open-minded toward the U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration’s warning about a type of stent proce-
dure. And Atir et al. (2015) observed that greater self- 
attribution of expertise predicted people’s claims to 
know what could not possibly be true. All of this sug-
gests that IH may be subject to related effects. Similarly, 
Hoyle et al. (2016) note that specific views were held 
with greater IH when they were not based on ‘personal 
exploration or study.’ Subjects who investigated issues 
for themselves tended to have lower specific IH than 
subjects whose views were held on some other basis 
(e.g., personal intuition or testimony). A related finding 
comes from Lockhart et al. (2016) and Fisher and Keil 
(2016): highly educated people overestimate their ability 
to explain topics about which they have formal training 
and expertise, compared to people who lack training on 
these topics. Self-perceptions of expertise can breed 
arrogance.
I’ve just described three factors that influence IH: (1) 
metacognitive abilities, (2) personal security and threats 
to meaning and values, and (3) self-views. These are by 
no means the only important factors. Others may 
include differences in first-order cognitive processing, 
motivation, accountability, embodied cognition, role- 
modeling, instruction, and tolerance of ambiguity. For 
researchers to determine how to promote IH effectively, 
they must better understand a wide array of factors that 
support and undermine IH. For now, I offer a few obser-
vations concerning metacognitive abilities, personal 
security, and self-views.
First, if metacognitive abilities influence the posses-
sion of IH, we need to investigate which metacognitive 
perspectives enable IH and how those can be acquired. 
Krumrei-Mancuso (2017) found that IH could be induced 
by asking people to think about issues from ‘a psycho-
logically distanced perspective.’ Similarly, Lockhart et al. 
(2016) note one ‘possible way to leverage’ subjects into 
‘metacognitive insights’ involved imagining a scenario 
from a third-person perspective (p. 489). All of this high-
lights a connection with philosophy. Epistemologists 
who study rational belief and knowledge sometimes 
articulate principles and norms for good reasoning that 
guide people to metacognitive insights about their 
beliefs, knowledge, and intellectual capacities (for more 
see Ballantyne, 2019a). Potentially, philosophers and 
psychologists could work together to articulate and 
study IH-promoting metacognitive perspectives and 
techniques. Work on IH in this critical but underdeve-
loped space would reveal a fascinating point of contact 
between philosophy and psychology: good intellectual 
character. Most epistemologists who are interested in 
character work within the philosophical subfield of vir-
tue epistemology, but traditional and ‘mainstream’ epis-
temologists, who study principles and norms of good 
reasoning, can also contribute to our understanding of 
good intellectual character. Since good intellectual char-
acter calls for metacognitive perspectives, we need to 
know what those are, how they can be acquired, and 
how they can be promoted.
Second, if personal security and threats to meaning 
influence IH, we need to investigate which values 
encourage, or are at least not in tension with, IH. One 
dismal possibility is that training programs could aim to 
encourage IH while simultaneously undermining gains 
in IH by threatening students’ security or promoting 
values at odds with IH. In other words, inculcating IH 
can backfire. Imagine training students to become 
intellectually humble while at the same time making 
them feel insecure or existentially threatened in subtle 
or not so subtle ways. For concreteness, imagine the 
atheist Richard Dawkins teaching a course on IH at 
a conservative religious college in the United States. 
Here is a point of comparison. Lavelock et al. (2014) 
developed a workbook intervention to encourage gen-
eral humility. They found that positive outcomes could 
be chalked up to the fact that ‘the participants were 
humbled enough to increase their humility during the 
intervention . . . It took humility to get humility’ (p. 107). 
Similarly, the effective promotion of IH may require 
particular values – possibly including valuing IH itself – 
as well as personal security. Plausibly, it takes values 
and security to get IH, underscoring the crucial link 
between emotional learning and epistemic training 
(Porter, 2015). The challenges here are presently 
unclear. One underexplored topic concerns the idea 
that growth- and security-focused orientations toward 
personal beliefs involve tradeoffs of existential security 
and tolerance of others (Van Tongeren, Davis et al., 
2016). Such tradeoffs appear to raise a puzzle. 
Suppose you must have some degree of security to 
grow in IH, but growing in IH requires you to tolerate 
others’ perspectives. Imagine further that your security 
is threatened when you tolerate different perspectives. 
Then IH-promoting efforts will face resistance. 
Ironically, IH-promoting interventions could sometimes 
discourage IH. The possibility of tradeoffs between 
security and tolerance, and their impact on the promo-
tion of IH, deserves more attention. The topic appears 
essential for studying the functioning of IH in highly 
polarized debates and crisis situations.
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Third, if self-views influence the possession of IH, 
researchers must consider the perils of accurate self- 
evaluation (Dunning et al., 2004). That topic is closely 
related to the promotion of IH. Given that IH is often 
linked to someone’s having an accurate grasp of her 
intellectual limits, researchers need to think more 
about how people acquire self-views that bear on their 
having IH. A great deal of recent work in psychology has 
been devoted to self-judgment and it would be advan-
tageous to draw more on existing paradigms in the 
study of IH. Furthermore, work in psychology and philo-
sophy on the topic of epistemic expertise connects 
directly with one type of self-attribution that apparently 
influences IH – namely, the self-attribution of expertise. 
It’s plausible to expect that interventions that help peo-
ple to grasp their own lack of expertise in a domain 
could induce IH. Thus, new work on self-evaluation and 
recognition of expertise could naturally be brought to 
bear on the study of IH, deepening our understanding of 
techniques to promote IH.
At the moment, there is little work on interventions 
that promote IH. Lavelock et al. (2014) designed 
a workbook to encourage general humility, as I noted 
above, and found that participants’ humility increased 
significantly over time. Wright et al. (2017) describe 
a ‘writing therapy’ intervention, using techniques from 
computational linguistics. Briefly, they suggest that the 
‘semantic signature’ of humility can be identified and 
taught to learners through writing exercises, teaching 
them ‘to write and think in ways that align with how 
humble people write and think’ (p. 9). Meagher et al. 
(2019) found that an IH lesson delivered to undergrad-
uate students taking five-week courses led to greater 
perceptions of IH in others and greater compromise- 
seeking in cultural conflict as judged in students’ writ-
ing assignments. Such interventions merit further 
investigation. Concurrently, researchers should 
develop theoretical perspectives to help assess which 
type of techniques could plausibly contribute to suc-
cessful interventions. What sort of pedagogical models 
could be used for teaching IH? One possibility is that 
promoting IH is akin to promoting mental health 
through cognitive behavioral therapy. Another possibi-
lity is that the long tradition of cognitive regimens and 
practices associated with philosophical and ethical 
viewpoints, such as Stoicism, reveal potential avenues 
for dialogue between IH researchers in the sciences and 
humanities (see Ballantyne, 2019a, chapter 3). Even if 
the goal of promoting IH is clear enough, researchers 
need to reflect carefully on the ways and means avail-
able to do so.
Trying to promote IH raises many more questions, 
a few of which follow. How does IH develop in people 
over time? At what stage of development can we first 
recognize individual differences in people’s IH? Does IH 
have a genetic component? Are there relevant cross- 
cultural and gender differences? What is the relationship 
between IH and general intelligence? A multidisciplinary 
perspective seems essential for making sense of these 
sorts of issues, as exhibited in Danovitch et al. (2019). 
Children are egoistic and self-focused, but some of them 
will eventually have IH. Researchers should ask whether 
there are crucial periods in human development when 
IH can grow and how it is sustained or threatened over 
the course of a life. Ideally, IH-promoting efforts will 
target the optimal times and circumstances where IH 
can take root, and this calls for longitudinal studies. To 
make progress here, researchers need to know more 
about how IH is influenced by cognitive development, 
culture, economic security, and gender.
Second, when researchers seek to understand how IH 
can be promoted, what are the ideal categories of IH for 
them to examine? General IH may be hard to develop 
during short-term interventions (e.g., during a college 
semester), but developing specific IH may be a better 
bet. Some techniques may be good for inducing general 
IH but not specific IH, and vice versa. It may be that 
general IH is not typically correlated with the type of 
domain IH (e.g., religious or political IH) that’s most 
important to us, meaning that we can make people 
higher in general IH without giving them more IH 
where it counts. Furthermore, in light of research on 
the domain-specificity of learning and expertise, 
researchers should explore IH-promoting interventions 
that target domain IH. If the activities supporting IH are 
not learned and practiced in a specific domain, IH is not 
likely to become a relatively stable trait.
4. What are the benefits of intellectual 
humility?
IH appears to be beneficial. Almost everyone will agree 
that, generally, IH is better than intellectual arrogance. 
But in what sense of ‘good’ is IH supposed to be good for 
people? And why is IH always good rather than neutral? 
Could it be bad in some situations? Could IH be good for 
us but bad or neutral for the people with whom we 
interact? Does IH have any unrecognized ‘dark sides’?
Many researchers have speculated about the poten-
tial benefits of IH and general humility. Consider two 
representative examples: ‘IH presumably holds unique 
potential to promote human thriving through tolerance 
of [others’] ideas, collaboration, and civil discourse’ 
(Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016, p. 209); ‘one naturally 
expects that intellectually humble people would pro-
mote the epistemic flourishing of their collaborators 
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(perhaps even at an epistemic cost to themselves) in 
problem-solving social contexts’ (Alfano et al., 2017, 
p. 25). Some researchers have devised studies that pur-
port to reveal connections between IH and beneficial 
states. But the topic is underexplored at present. We 
can describe the subject as the ‘value theory’ of IH.
The relationship between IH and various beneficial 
states is impossible to assess from the armchair. Ideally, 
researchers could determine how different levels of IH 
interact with cognition and situations in order to pro-
duce particular outcomes. That goal is relatively remote. 
For the most part, what we have are theoretically moti-
vated speculations and some preliminary correlational 
studies. Researchers have thus far noted potential ben-
efits that I’ll divide into three broad categories: (1) 
greater personal well-being, (2) greater prosociality, 
and (3) improved inquiry and learning for both indivi-
duals and groups.
First, researchers have linked general humility to per-
sonal well-being. Nadelhoffer et al. (2016) note that 
general humility is connected to concepts such as gen-
tleness, empathy, and gratitude, suggesting that humi-
lity may predict happiness or contentment. Krause 
(2010) found that higher levels of general humility 
were associated with better self-rated physical health. 
Davis et al. (2013) observe that subjects high in trait 
humility (a measure of consensus among other-report 
ratings) tend to report better interpersonal relationships 
as well as greater patience and empathy.
But how is IH connected to well-being? If we think of 
IH as a hypoegoic mindset in the domain of inquiry or 
intellectual life, it’s hard to see why IH must tend toward 
greater well-being. Why can’t high levels of IH tend to 
make people less happy than they would be otherwise? 
Some evidence supports the idea that IH can endanger 
well-being. Psychologists who study ‘growth-focused’ 
and ‘security-focused’ orientations examine the role or 
function of beliefs in providing existential security (Van 
Tongeren, Davis et al., 2016). As noted above, growth- 
focused believers will question and doubt their own 
views, whereas security-oriented believers use their 
views as a source of comfort and clarity. Researchers 
have found that subjects, in response to threats to 
meaning (including implicit threats), deploy strategies 
to reestablish meaning and security (Van Tongeren & 
Green, 2010). The resources people have at hand to 
combat existential threats depend on their worldviews. 
Van Tongeren and collaborators found that security- 
focused participants, who hold ‘defensive’ religious 
beliefs, reported greater existential well-being than par-
ticipants whose beliefs were less defensive. The 
researchers comment: ‘it appears that being strongly 
committed to one’s defensive religious beliefs is an 
important feature in providing existential security’ (Van 
Tongeren, Davis et al., 2016, p. 85). In another study, Van 
Tongeren, Davis et al. (2016) observed that security- 
focused belief is associated with existential well-being, 
and subjects’ level of religious commitment enhanced 
that positive relationship. Furthermore, the researchers 
again found that subjects who had growth-focused 
beliefs reported greater existential anxiety in the face 
of threats to meaning than subjects with security- 
focused beliefs.
It’s unclear what this research tells us about the rela-
tionship between IH and personal well-being. First, some 
earlier work shows that closed-mindedness is associated 
with a predisposition to experience psychological inse-
curity (Ottati et al., 2015 provides references). Second, 
existential security is typically measured by self-report 
methods. But could subjects who hold certain types of 
‘defensive’ belief tend to self-enhance, claiming greater 
security than they actually experience? That is 
a possibility. Security-focused believers may exaggerate 
their actual sense of security because their ‘defensive’ 
beliefs tell them they feel security or that expressing 
doubt about one’s security is unacceptable. The noted 
disparity in existential well-being between security- and 
growth-focused believers could be similar to an observa-
tion about political orientation and happiness – namely, 
that conservatives in the United States report greater 
happiness but liberals display greater happiness (Wojcik 
et al., 2015). That research on political orientation and 
happiness seeks to show that self-reports of subjective 
well-being are problematic due to conservatives’ ‘self- 
enhancing style’ of self-reporting. More research is 
needed to understand how IH is related to well-being 
and, if there are links, what mechanisms might explain 
them.
A second sort of benefit IH could generate is greater 
prosociality. We can say that prosocial benefits improve 
the quality of relationships between individuals. Such 
benefits have been documented in research on humility 
and IH. Leman et al. (2016) comment: ‘In broad terms, 
humility correlates negatively with motivations to 
acquire greater status and resources at the expense of 
others and is correlated positively with altruism, social 
harmony, and low sociopolitical dominance’ (p. 146). 
Interestingly, the mere perception of humility is also 
linked to prosocial benefits. Davis et al. (2013) found 
that offenders who were perceived by subjects as 
being more humble received greater forgiveness. Hook 
et al. (2015) reported that IH was positively associated 
with forgiveness, even after controlling for perceived 
general humility. Krumrei-Mancuso (2017) found that 
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IH predicted self-reported prosocial outcomes, such as 
empathy, gratitude, altruism, benevolence, and less 
power seeking.
It should be unsurprising that IH can sometimes 
improve relationships. If it is a hypoegoic mindset, we 
might predict that someone high in IH will consider 
other people’s perspectives in appropriate circum-
stances. Such a person will use others’ perspectives as 
pathways to becoming better oriented toward reality. In 
support of such expectations, Paine et al. (2016) found 
a positive correlation between general humility and 
‘intercultural competence’ (the ability to effectively navi-
gate interpersonal differences). Intercultural compe-
tence requires increased receptivity to unfamiliar 
beliefs and values. Presumably, IH assists people in 
recognizing and understanding others better than intel-
lectual arrogance does, all other things being equal, 
though I speculate that intellectually arrogant people 
may not be comparatively deficient in understanding 
members of their ingroup. Krumrei-Mancuso (2017) 
found that IH predicts greater perspective-taking, but 
goes a step further, proposing that ‘IH should result in 
people not merely tolerating others, but valuing them 
for their otherness, leading to greater gratitude for them’ 
(p. 15). If we accept that the essence of IH narrowly 
concerns intellectual life or inquiry, it is doubtful 
whether prosocial benefits such as valuing other people 
will be predicted by IH alone.
In any event, some evidence suggests that religious 
IH is linked to religious tolerance. Tolerance appears to 
be one way to regard other people as valuable, at least in 
the sense that they deserve some sort of epistemic or 
moral respect. Leary et al. (2017) found that subjects 
high in IH tend to judge other people less on the basis 
of the religious opinions they express. Similarly, Van 
Tongeren, Hakim, et al. (2016) observe that religious IH 
positively predicts religious tolerance. Religious IH may 
be a crucial factor for promoting religious tolerance, as 
the philosopher Philip Quinn argued (see Kraft & 
Basinger, 2008 for discussion). That said, IH could some-
times undermine tolerance if it makes someone doubt 
that tolerance is morally good, that morality is objective, 
or that others deserve moral respect. But some of the 
prosocial consequences of IH seem to follow from the 
fact that intellectually humble people can ‘bridge’ 
potentially fractious divisions between ingroups and 
outgroups. Even so, the strategies that intellectually 
humble people use to do so remain unknown; ethno-
graphic research and case studies would be useful 
here. Van Tongeren, Hakim et al. (2016) note that people 
high in religious IH may resist ‘simplistic or black-and- 
white views’ concerning religious beliefs and come to 
recognize their own beliefs are to some extent doubtful 
(p. 213). That point suggests how metacognitive abilities 
for assessing one’s level of justified confidence may play 
a role in allowing IH to boost tolerance. A related possi-
bility is that IH regulates arrogant perceptions of out-
group members as mistaken and intellectually flawed. 
Intolerant or hostile reactions can lead people to dis-
count, disparage, and even destroy outgroup members. 
One open question is whether a special element of 
religious subdomain IH leads to greater tolerance (e.g., 
commitment to other-oriented religious precepts or 
teachings, such as ‘Love your enemies’), or whether IH 
expressed in other subdomains will likewise predict tol-
erance. Future work on the links between IH and toler-
ance should reflect on the different types of respect that 
IH may, or may not, bring in its wake.
Third, researchers have said that IH has epistemic 
benefits that improve inquiry and learning. Does IH 
make it more likely for people to gain truths, avoid 
errors, or attain other valuable intellectual ends? The 
question seems straightforward but it has received little 
investigation thus far. One possibility is that some 
researchers have built into their characterizations of IH 
the assumption that it will produce good epistemic out-
comes, at least in ordinary circumstances. People high in 
IH will tend to have epistemically ‘better’ beliefs or 
inquiries than people low in IH, all other things being 
equal. If researchers do embrace that assumption, they 
should make it explicit. As far as I can tell, we can 
characterize IH and then subsequently ask whether hav-
ing IH is good for some type of inquiry and, if so, how.
One finding, from Leary et al. (2017), is that subjects 
high in IH more effectively distinguished strong from 
weak arguments and reported their views were more 
affected by the stronger arguments, compared to sub-
jects low in IH. Porter and Schumann (2018) found that 
people with high IH exposed themselves more to oppos-
ing political perspectives and had greater openness to 
learning about rival positions during imaginary debate. 
Zmigrod et al. (2019) propose that intellectual humility 
could inoculate people against misinformation and ideo-
logical polarization. If such claims are correct, then IH is 
connected to greater success in seeking out and evalu-
ating evidence, precisely as we should expect from 
a hypoegoic mindset that down-regulates egoistic 
motives in favor of reality-orientedness. But the empiri-
cal evidence is limited. I speculate that high IH could 
sometimes make inquirers worse off. Consider that cli-
mate warming denialists, Bigfoot hunters, and ancient 
alien theorists frequently appeal to the limits of our 
knowledge and fallibility when promulgating their 
views in public. One possibility is that high IH – absent 
good background evidence about a topic – could leave 
people more susceptible to bad arguments and 
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misinformation than otherwise. Being intellectually 
humble could make us suckers. Presumably, even if IH 
is good for inquirers seeking truth and avoiding error, it 
isn’t necessarily invariably good all on its own. 
Researchers should try to determine the contexts 
where it does and does not perform optimally and 
what supplementary factors can boost its value.
Another potential epistemic benefit is greater access 
to other people’s perspectives. That may seem obviously 
true, since IH positions people to understand others’ 
views and ideas. But that’s too simple. Even if people 
search for new perspectives, the search may not increase 
their knowledge or understanding. An obstacle to per-
spective-taking is the ‘curse of knowledge,’ the inability 
to think about something from a less informed perspec-
tive (Camerer et al., 1989). Thus, even if IH primes people 
to consider other perspectives, they may be unable to 
truly ‘enter into’ those perspectives – unless IH tends to 
mitigate biases on perspective-taking such as the curse 
of knowledge. This issue generalizes. Suppose IH does 
not help people overcome various common biases. It 
follows that the type of activities characteristic of IH 
(e.g., managing attitudes in light of challenges, reaching 
accurate views about one’s own intellectual powers and 
achievements, etc.) may be performed poorly. If so, IH 
will fail to generate the desired epistemic benefits, to 
some degree. That said, it is natural to expect that, on 
tasks such as perspective-taking, people high in IH will 
perform better than those low in IH. (By contrast, 
Hannon, 2021 argues that suffering from the curse of 
knowledge and other failures of perspective-taking 
could well make someone more likely to have IH.)
We need to know whether, when, and how IH makes 
people more accurate in judgment and reasoning tasks. 
Here are some questions. Does IH help us debias for 
commonplace biases of judgment and reasoning? If so, 
how? Are people high in IH less prone to motivated 
reasoning? Could IH make people less prone to over-
estimate their knowledge? Does IH provide benefits in 
overcoming biases of self-judgment more than biases of 
social judgment? Will subjects high in IH perform better 
than subjects low in IH in ‘judgment tournaments’ 
(Tetlock et al., 2014) where they aim to predict future 
events on the basis of current evidence? How do people 
high in IH contribute positively to group inquiry? 
Knowing the answers to such questions would begin 
to clarify the epistemic benefits of IH.
Consider another potential epistemic benefit: people 
high in IH may more easily recognize their dependence 
on others’ knowledge. They may more readily defer to 
knowledgeable others and take others’ criticism to heart, 
at least when doing so is normatively appropriate. 
People high in IH may more often appreciate their 
dependence on ‘the community of knowledge’ 
(Sloman & Rabb, 2016). If this is the case, it would be 
useful to know more about the mechanisms involved. 
Perhaps IH makes it easier for people to discern the 
difference between what they can know on their own 
and what is known through others (Lockhart et al., 2016). 
In other words, IH may secure epistemic benefits by way 
of advantages in metacognitive abilities. Or perhaps the 
benefits flow from the fact that IH is hypoegoic, meaning 
that people high in IH will be less dismissive and hostile 
toward knowledgeable others. As a result, for people 
high in IH, contact with epistemic advisors or superiors 
won’t trigger defensive reactions.
I have noted three types of benefits linked to IH: (1) 
greater personal well-being, (2) greater prosociality, and 
(3) improved inquiry for both individuals and groups. 
Evidently, IH could carry many benefits as well as costs. 
One possibility is that some of these benefits (and costs) 
are co-effects of other factors; it is possible, for example, 
that factors which promote well-being also promote IH. 
But there is imprecision in some of the key constructs 
here and we need a better grasp of the notions of 
prosociality, tolerance, and good inquiry in order to 
gauge what the benefits of IH may be. Further investiga-
tion into these issues should be taken up by researchers 
in psychology and philosophy.
5. Conclusion
This review has described answers to several questions 
examined in recent work on IH. As I close, I’ll step back 
from the ins and outs of the literature and share a few 
ideas that may help advance future discussion.
First, IH researchers should somehow address the 
dominance of dispositional theories. As I have pointed 
out, IH is nearly universally treated as a mindset, disposi-
tion, or personality trait. We have seen distinctive and 
conflicting characterizations of IH, but it is standardly 
thought to be a stable attribute of persons or person-
ality. Think of this as the field’s dispositionalism. This 
presumption is not surprising given that influential 
research on IH is by scholars from fields where person-
ality and character are the stock-in-trade. But disposi-
tionalism could seem to be the only game in town 
because of the fundamental attribution error: research-
ers may mistakenly assume that humble behaviors are 
the product of humble character as opposed to humility- 
promoting situations. In any event, while a dispositional 
approach can offer insights into who is intellectually 
humble and tell us how other traits are related to IH, it 
does not illuminate what intellectually humble activities 
or processes are or what sort of factors support humble, 
open-minded inquiry. To better understand the 
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particular activities and processes that comprise humble 
inquiry, we need to move beyond merely dispositionalist 
approaches, as some have already begun to do (Zachry 
et al., 2018; see also Grossmann, 2017). The relationship 
between character and context needs attention, espe-
cially if the field begins to invest effort in designing 
interventions. There’s much more to learn about organi-
zational structures, social contexts, and the aspects of 
intellectual tasks that encourage IH-promoting activities 
and processes – whatever those may turn out to be.
Second, IH researchers should practice methodologi-
cal openness and curiosity. While observing the litera-
ture on IH expand enormously over the last several 
years, I have been reminded of Paul Rozin’s (2001) plea 
to fellow social psychologists. Rozin thought social psy-
chology’s standard techniques to understand the social 
world (laboratory experiments, statistical analyses, cau-
sal modelling, etc.) were invaluable, but he underlined 
the role of ‘careful observation, informed curiosity, [and] 
recognition of the importance of context and the limits 
of abstract and laboratory-based models’ (p. 12). It is all 
too easy, Rozin noted, for psychologists to lose sight of 
the ‘big social phenomena’ also examined by research-
ers in fields such as anthropology and sociology (p. 12). 
Rozin elevated the late Solomon Asch as one example of 
a psychologist who kept an eye on the ‘big picture’. 
Asch’s classic experiments ‘were among the precursors 
of the modern experimental paradigms,’ but Asch was 
also educated in history, literature, and other sciences, 
and so was ‘very much inclined to put his work into a rich 
context’ (p. 13). Rozin’s call for methodological openness 
and humility contains wisdom for IH researchers, too. 
The field has an opportunity to welcome a broader 
range of data and tools than is found at present. 
I might add that Rozin’s suggestions can be applied to 
philosophical explorations no less than scientific ones.
Finally, a truism: IH researchers’ efforts are shaped by 
cultural assumptions, values, institutions, and incentives, 
and it is wise for researchers to try to scrutinize their 
influences. Nobody can step outside of the historical 
moment to study IH from some neutral, ideology-free 
perspective, but we can try to expand our own horizons 
a bit. To this end, I suggest consulting history. By learn-
ing about past reflection on humility-connected ques-
tions and themes, we might better recognize the 
influences on our present investigations. Studies by his-
torians describing how thinkers have sought to under-
stand and promote humble, open-minded intellectual 
character can be stimulating. My favorite books in that 
genre include Steven Shapin’s A Social History of Truth: 
Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England 
(1993), Sorana Corneanu’s Regimens of the Mind: Boyle, 
Locke, and the Early Modern Cultura Animi Tradition 
(2011), and Jamie Cohen-Cole’s The Open Mind: Cold 
War Politics and the Sciences of Human Nature (2014). 
I close by gesturing at a couple themes from Cohen- 
Cole’s outstanding book, hinting at how studying history 
might spur IH researchers to think anew about their 
ideas.
In the early years of the Cold War, American intellec-
tuals, academics, and policy makers promoted open- 
mindedness as a vital civic virtue. The open mind, as 
they understood it, was a style of thinking characterized 
by the exercise of reason, autonomy, and creativity; it 
was broad, flexible, and unprejudiced. This cognitive 
style served U.S. foreign policy interests well, the elites 
believed, because it challenged an authoritarian political 
system, such as the Soviet Union, which could not abide 
divergent values in its population. On the domestic 
front, the open mind was a source for tolerance and 
the appreciation of pluralism – and an antidote for the 
allure of the conformist homogeneity of a Soviet-style 
system. As Cohen-Cole puts it, ‘the open mind was 
intended to make America more liberal’ (2014, p. 7).
Powerful elites at institutions such as Harvard, 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the 
National Science Foundation infused the ideal of the 
open mind into scientific research and educational pol-
icy, in hopes of bolstering liberal democratic values. In 
1964–65, Jerome Bruner, a psychologist at Harvard, 
received funding from the Ford Foundation and the 
NSF to design an elementary school curriculum in social 
studies named ‘Man: A Course of Study’ (2014, chapter 7). 
The course was intended to explore three questions: 
‘What is human about human beings? How did they 
get that way? How can they be made more so?’ 
Although the course did not explicitly supply answers, 
students were in training to become budding scientists, 
and the curriculum tacitly assumed that becoming more 
human meant becoming more scientific (2014, pp. 190– 
191, 210). The course, which was soon widely used in the 
U.S. and beyond, was designed to equip young people 
with critical-thinking skills and a broad-minded sensibil-
ity, thereby inoculating them ‘against the kind of wrong- 
headedness, reactionary politics, and dishonesty that 
typified McCarthyism’ (p. 214).
By Cohen-Cole’s retelling, the ideal of the open mind 
had sweeping social and political significance during 
the Cold War. For a time, the ideal served the goals of 
country’s centrists and center-left until the 1970s when 
conservatives counterattacked, arguing that the open 
mind smuggled in an anti-American, secular agenda 
(2014, chapter 8). A cognitive ideal that had once 
appeared unifying to many now became much more 
divisive. The open mind was a facet of Cold War liberal 
ideology embraced by elites but it ultimately failed 
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because it took for granted a consensus about values 
that did not exist in the United States. Even so, the 
open mind served as a lodestar for new work in fields 
like psychology, cognitive science, and educational pol-
icy. Researchers, whether they recognized it or not, 
made their contributions while suspended in 
a complex web of political values and institutional 
influences.
There is no ideology-free perspective to take on IH 
and our efforts to study it are rooted in our moment in 
hard-to-recognize ways. As I see things, IH researchers 
would benefit from a deeper understanding of the 
broader intellectual, cultural, and political projects in 
which IH plays a role – and how their conceptions of IH 
and its purposes are sensitive to those projects. Trying to 
be mindful of such matters may or may not help 
researchers discern how their outlooks are limited, but 
they will be prompted to look for the ‘big picture’. That is 
an exercise befitting the study of intellectual humility.11
Notes
1. Here and below, I could use ‘regulates or is associated 
with’ and the like. Some psychologists resist the idea 
that mindsets (or dispositions or traits) have causal prop-
erties. I sideline that issue and speak as though mindsets 
bring about certain states of affairs, but we could also 
characterize the mindsets as being associated with cer-
tain states of affairs. (Thanks to Mark Leary for 
discussion.)
2. Thanks to three anonymous referees for comments on 
matters of conceptual diversity, not all of which I could 
address in this space.
3. Price et al. (2015) appeal to a similar notion in their 
discussion of ‘open-minded cognition.’
4. Perhaps distinguishing between topical domain IH and 
functional domain IH is useful. For simplicity’s sake, 
I collapse that distinction into a single notion of domain 
IH.
5. Thanks to Mark Leary for this point.
6. As I’m thinking of it, a process of down-regulation could 
be intentional or not: IH involves both slow, deliberative 
activity and fast, automatic processing. I should add that 
IH might involve motives to be interested in reaching 
truth and avoiding falsehood, but not necessarily. IH 
may do its job simply by removing or overcoming the 
obstacles due to egoic or egoistic motives, not by intro-
ducing distinct motives to get things right.
7. A different sort of possibility for finding a core concept is 
to conceptualize IH as a merely operational notion – IH is 
what IH does. In the spirit of Attitude Management 
accounts, suppose IH is whatever makes inquirers more 
open to new ideas, counterarguments, and controversial 
perspectives. This sort of concept of IH may help 
researchers to look in new and unexpected places for 
IH, because situational factors, group dynamics, and 
features of embodied cognition doubtless contribute 
to greater (or lesser) openness in inquiry. This sort of 
conceptualization suggests a way for researchers to find 
more common ground, though it marks a departure 
from recent work. (Thanks to Norbert Schwarz for 
discussion.)
8. Don Davis reports (email correspondence) that he has 
collected more than 400 samples as of summer 2020.
9. I should also note that self-attributions of IH can require 
admitting intellectual limitations and mistakes, but 
doing so may be undesirable for many people. 
I suspect the level of IH may be relevant here. Perhaps 
it’s more desirable to embrace general IH than specific 
IH. The latter may involve admitting defects or mistakes 
with respect to specific issues, whereas the former may 
only involve admitting fallibility in some general sense.
10. Questions about the ontology of IH are crucial for think-
ing about interventions. Depending on what type of 
thing IH happens to be, its promotion will be relatively 
harder or easier.
11. As a philosopher trying to comment on psychological 
research, I feared the dangers of ‘epistemic trespassing’ 
upon a field where I lack expertise (Ballantyne, 2019b), 
and I’m indebted to many people for their advice. For 
comments or conversations related to different versions 
of this material, I am grateful to Alex Arnold, Jason 
Baehr, Richard Bollinger, Jared Celniker, Don Davis, 
Peter Ditto, David Dunning, William Dyer, Elise Dykhuis, 
Eranda Jayawickreme, Mertcan Gungor, Benjamin 
Meagher, Tenelle Porter, Peter Seipel, and Benjamin 
Wilson. Special thanks go to Mark Leary for detailed 
feedback on an early draft and Norbert Schwarz for 
enlightening conversations about these issues. 
I benefited from criticism and guidance from four anon-
ymous reviewers for the Journal of Positive Psychology. 
Noah Hahn and Allysa Lake deserve my thanks for their 
assistance and patience with seemingly unending 
Interlibrary Loan requests. Finally, I want to acknowl-
edge the generous support I received from the John 
Templeton Foundation (grant #60900) and encourage-
ment from Alex Arnold, John Churchill, and Michael 
Murray.
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